The Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999
and Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Call
for Congressional Self-Restraint*
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Physician-assisted suicide is gaining prominence in our social
consciousness as patients and physicians, legislatures and courts wrestle
with how best to resolve the profound differences of opinion regarding
its practice. This Comment addresses the legal and structural arguments
surrounding whether the decision to permit or prohibit physicianassisted suicide should be made by Congress or by the states.
In Washington v. Glucksberg,' the 1997 landmark decision upholding
a state ban on assisted suicide, the Supreme Court provided Congress
and the American people with the following guidance: "Throughout the
Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about
the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our
holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic
society.,2 In direct opposition to this sage advice, Congress is seeking to
foreclose the physician-assisted suicide debate through its "heavyhanded"3 amendment to the Controlled Substances Act of 1970.4 This
amendment, deceptively called the Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999,"

will effectively nullify the only law in the United States permitting

physician-assisted suicide6 -Oregon's Death with Dignity Act-and
1. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
2. Id. at 735 (emphasis added).
3. In a letter dated October 20, 1999, addressed to Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), the
bill's chief sponsor, Assistant Attorney General Robert Raben wrote that imposing the
penalties contemplated under the bill "would affirmatively interfere with state policymaking in a particularly heavy-handed way." Dave Hogan & Mark O'Keefe, AntiSuicide Bill DrawsNew Fire:A U.S. Justice Department Letter Says a House Measure
to Block Oregon's Law Affects Other States' Rights to Make Their Own Policy, THE
OREGONIAN, Oct. 21, 1999, at Al.
4. In particular, the proposed bill amends 21 U.S.C. §§ 823 and 872(a) (1994).
The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1994), provides a uniform
national standard for the control of potentially dangerous drugs, and empowers the Drug
Enforcement Administration to enforce its provisions and penalties. H.R. REP. No. 106378, pt. 1, at 2 (1999). Section 841 of the Controlled Substances Act makes it "unlawful
for any person [to] knowingly or intentionally. . . distribute, or dispense ... a controlled
substance" "[e]xcept as authorized by this [Control and Enforcement] subchapter." 21
U.S.C. § 841(a). The subchapter creates an exception allowing physicians to distribute
or dispense controlled substances, provided the physician has applied for and received a
federal prescribing license from the Attorney General. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f). See also
H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 2 (1999).
5. H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 1272, 106th Cong. (1999).
6. The Oregon physician-assisted suicide law is the only law of its kind in the
world. Sam Howe Verhovek, Oregon Reporting 15 Deaths in 1998 UnderSuicide Law,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 1999, at Al. The Northern Territory of Australia legalized assisted
suicide for a period between July 1996 and March 1997. Id. In the Netherlands, assisted
suicide is technically illegal, but it is rarely prosecuted. Id. It is important to note that
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abrogate this debate in other states contemplating physician-assisted
suicide legislation.! It is important to note that physician-assisted
suicide refers to the voluntary self-administration of lethal drugs legally
prescribed by a physician to provide aid in dying.' It is not active

euthanasia, which would entail a physician directly ending the life of a
patient. ° The Pain Relief Promotion Act would prevent physicianassisted suicide in two respects, both of which are indirect." First, the
proposed bill subjects physicians who prescribe certain controlled
substances to a terminally ill patient, for the purpose of hastening death,
to revocation of their license to prescribe controlled substances, civil
penalties, and up to twenty years imprisonment.'2 These controlled

because physician-assisted suicide is, in a practical sense, not governed by law in the
Netherlands, there is some evidence that cases of both voluntary and involuntary
euthanasia are taking place. Id. Under Oregon law neither form of euthanasia is
possible because of the strict controls placed on patient competency and because the
lethal prescription is provided directly to the patient who self-administers the drugs. See
infra note 36 (describing restrictions and safeguards of the Oregon law).
7. OR.REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.897 (Supp. 1998).
8. Maine voters considered, and ultimately rejected, a physician-assisted suicide

referendum in November, 2000, after the Maine Legislature rejected a similar bill in
1998. Glenn Adams, Right-to-Die Advocates File Referendum Petitions: Assisted
Suicide Question May Go to Voters in 2000, BANGOR DAtLY NEws, Sept. 27. 1999, at
B1; Suicide Voted Down, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2000, at A18. In California. AB 1592,

legislation similar to Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, lapsed on inactive file on Feb. 3.
2000.

AB 1592 Assembly Bill-History, at http./www.leginfo.ca.gov/pubfbill/

asm/ab_1551-1600/ab_1592-20000203_history.html (last visited Feb. 1.2000).
9. "Assisted suicide" is the "intentional act of providing a person with the
medical means or the medical kmowledge to commit suicide." BLAc's LAW
DIcTIONARY 1447 (7th ed. 1999).

10. 'Euthanasia" is the "act or practice of killing or bringing about the death of a
person who suffers from an incurable disease or condition, [especially] a painful one, for
reasons of mercy. Euthanasia is sometimes regarded by the law as second-degree
murder, manslaughter, or criminally negligent homicide." Id. at 575. "Active
euthanasia" is "[e]uthanasia performed by a facilitator ([usually] a physician) who not
only provides the means of death but also carries out the final death-causing act." Id.
11. The tension between whether the Pain Relief Promotion Act directly or
indirectly preempts Oregon state law is illustrated in the reports of two House
Committees: the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Commerce. The
House Committee on the Judiciary reports: "H.R. 2260 does not preempt Oregon's law
legalizing assisted suicide in specified circumstances. Its only legal effect is to forbid
the use of those drugs which are federally controlled for this purpose." H.R. REP. No.
106-378, pt. 1, at 11 n.45 (1999). However, the House Committee on Commerce reports
that this bill does preempt Oregon law. "[Directing the Attorney General to give no
force and effect to state law] would be a preemption of the Oregon 'Daath with Dignity
Act' because it would limit the options available to doctors acting under that state law."
H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 2, at 9-10 (1999).
12. Revocation of a physician's national prescribing license means that the

substances, particularly barbiturates, are the only drugs that efficiently
end a person's life without suffering. 3 Second, terminally ill patients
desiring the assistance of a physician to help them die would necessarily
have to resort to medications not controlled by the government, 4 none of
which are as effective or reliable as the controlled substances, raising the
specter of botched suicide attempts.
The Pain Relief Promotion Act is not yet federal law. At the time of
this writing, the bill had passed the House of Representatives in 1999 but
failed to come up for a vote in the Senate before the 106th Congress
adjourned.' 5 While in office, President Clinton publicly opposed
physician-assisted suicide 6 but refrained from openly supporting the
Pain Relief Promotion Act because it so blatantly interferes with states'

physician is no longer permitted to prescribe certain substances controlled under 21
U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1994). H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 3 n.4 (1999). "The
Attorney General may deny an application for such registration if he determines that the
issuance of such registration would be inconsistent with the public interest." 21 U.S.C. §
823(0 (1999).
Factors to be considered in making this determination include
recommendations of state licensing boards or professional disciplinary authority; the
physician's experience in dispensing or conducting research regarding controlled
substances; the physician's conviction record regarding dispensing controlled
substances; compliance with local, state, and federal laws; and "[such other conduct
which may threaten the public health and safety." Id. Civil and criminal penalties for
violation of the Controlled Substances Act can range up to life imprisonment and a fine
up to four million dollars depending upon the substance in question. Id. § 841(b).
13. The drugs recommended for use under the Oregon physician-assisted suicide
law are "high dose, short acting barbiturates, an anti-emetic, beta-adrenergic blocker and
alcohol." THE CENTER FOR ETHICS IN HEALTH CARE, THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY
ACT: A GUIDEBOOK FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 34 (Kathleen Haley & Melinda Lee
eds., 1998).
14. Revocation of the prescribing license does not preclude the physician from
practicing medicine or from prescribing substances that are not controlled by the federal
government. However, revocation of one's national prescribing license is only one of
several possible penalties to which physicians could be subjected under the Controlled
Substances Act and the Pain Relief Promotion Act. 21 U.S.C. § 84 1(b). See also infra
note 64 (discussing penalties for violation of the Controlled Substances Act).
15. On October 27, 1999, House Bill 2260 passed the House of Representatives by
a vote of 271 to 156. House Votes to Ban Doctor-AssistedSuicide, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 28,
1999, at A14. Senator Don Nickles (R-Okla.) was unsuccessful in his attempt to get the
bill passed through the Senate in the final days of December, 2000. Jim Barnett, Nickles
Will Continue Suicide Fight, THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 8, 2000, at A6; John Giglio, PRPA
Not Passed as Congress Adjourns!, at http://www.stopprpa.org/frame-intro.htm (last
modified Dec. 19, 2000).
16. President Clinton signed the Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act
of 1997, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14401-14408 (1994), which prohibits the use of federal funds in
support of physician-assisted suicide. Upon signing this bill, President Clinton
commented that it "will allow the Federal Government to speak with a clear voice in
opposing these practices," and warned that "to endorse assisted suicide would set us on a
disturbing and perhaps dangerous path." Statement by President William Jefferson
Clinton on Signing the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, 33 WEEKLY
COMp. PRES. DOC. 617 (Apr. 30, 1997).
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rights.

Although the legislation has been defeated for the moment, the

bill will likely be reintroduced this year in the 107th Congress.' s
Aside from explaining the provisions and proposed operation of the
Pain Relief Promotion Act, this Comment will not attempt to argue its

merits per se, that is, whether physician-assisted suicide should be
permitted or prohibited. On the contrary, this Comment is confined to
exploring the constitutionality of Congress's attempt to regulate in a
manner deliberately designed to overturn the will of Oregon voters, and
how that regulation impinges upon the principles of federalism

underlying the United States Constitution. Essentially, this Comment
argues that physician-assisted suicide is an issue that should be decided

state by state, not by Congress as a matter of national policy.
Part II sets out the specific provisions of Oregon's Death with Dignity
Act, and its procedures and safeguards. This law was twice passed by
Oregon voters.2' In addition, the first two years of physician-assisted
suicide under the Death with Dignity Act show that the law is working
very well; contrary to the slippery slope fears of opponents, there has
been no evidence to support the notion that the Act will lead to abuse or
mistakes.2 '
Part 11 also examines the first, hasty congressional attempt to block
Oregon's physician-assisted suicide law, the Lethal Drug Abuse
17. House Votes to Ban Doctor-AssistedSuicide, supra note 15. President Clinton.
in a speech on federalism, stated:
[Wle've had this history of believing from the time of our founders that the
national government would never have all the answers, and that the states
should be seen as our friends and our partners because they could be
laboratories for democracy. They could always be out there pushing the
envelope of change. And certain things would be possible politically in some
places that would not be possible in others.
President Wlliam Jefferson Clinton, Remarks by the Presidentto Forum of Federation
Conference, in Mont-Tremblant, Canada (Oct. 8, 1999), at http://www.pub.whitehouse.
govluri-resI2R?urn:pdiloma.eop.gov.us/199911018118.text
(visited Feb. 4,2000).
18. Giglio, supra note 15.
19. There is an abundance of literature on this point. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar. On
the Meaning and Impact of the Physician-AssistedSuicide Cases, 82 MINN. L REv. 895
(1998); Edward J. Larson, Essay, Prescriptionfor Death:A Second Opinion, 44 DEPAUtL
L. REv. 461 (1995); Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A ConstitutionalRight?, 24 DuQ.
L. REv. 1 (1985); Timothy Quill, Physician Assisted Death: After the U.S. Supreme
Court Ruling, 75 U. Dar. MERcY L. REv. 481 (1998); Thomas F. Schindler. Assisted
Suicide and Euthanasia:EthicalDimensions of the Public Debate,72 U. DEr. MERcY L.
REv. 719 (1995); Patrick M. Curran, Jr., Note, Regulating Death: Oregon's Death with
Dignity Act and the Legalizationof Physician-AssistedSuicide, 86 GEO. U. 725 (1998).
20.
21.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part ll.B.

Prevention Act of 1998.2 The significance of this bill, although it failed
to garner sufficient support for passage, is that it clearly shows the
fundamental purpose of its successor bill, the Pain Relief Promotion Act
of 1999. 23 Both bills, at their core, specifically seek to punish physicians
for conduct that is legal under Oregon state law: dispensing controlled
substances to competent and informed, terminally ill patients who
voluntarily request such medication in order to hasten death. The effect
of this legislation, if it becomes law, will be to deny Oregon voters the
benefit of their state law.
Part III examines potential constitutional arguments that could be
raised to prevent Congress's interference, through the Pain Relief
Promotion Act, with Oregon state law. Several points will be made.
First, Congress, through its Commerce Clause power, has the
constitutional authority to regulate the medical use of controlled
substances in the states.'
Second, a constitutional argument that
Congress may not regulate state medical practices, based on traditional
state dominance in that area, is insufficient to limit Congress's
commerce power2 Third, Congress may exercise its commerce power
based on moral and social policy motives. Finally, individual rights
claims, under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause, will
likewise be insufficient to limit Congress's power to regulate controlled
substances in the states.27
Part IV argues that, although Congress has and should have the power
necessary to regulate some intrastate activity (such as how physicians
prescribe controlled substances), in the area of physician-assisted suicide
Congress should refrain from exercising this authority. Based on the
important principles of federalism that apply in this debate, Congress
should allow states to determine their own policy. First, physician aid in
dying is a profound, personal decision, and policy governing it should be
made as close to voters as practical. Because voters have more influence
in, and greater opportunities to participate in, policy decisions at the
state level than at the national level, states should determine for
themselves whether physician-assisted suicide is an appropriate social
policy.2 Second, the importance of electoral accountability supports the
argument that this social policy should be made by the decision-makers
22.
23.
II.C.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (1998). See infra Part II.C.
H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 1272, 106th Cong. (1999).
See infra Part lI.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.D.
See infra Part IV.B.

See infra Part
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most accountable to state voters.2 Oregon voters have decided for
themselves to permit physician-assisted suicide; members of Congress,

all but seven unaccountable to Oregon voters, should not override that
decision. Finally, federalism provides the opportunity for states to
innovate in solving local issues. Through debate and experimentation,
states mold and polish solutions uniquely tailored to the needs of their
citizens. These solutions can then be borrowed and adapted, or rejected,
by other states according to their needs." However, when Congress

preempts state law, as it proposes to do in this case, such innovation
becomes a one-size-fits-all national social policy. This kind of federal
approach to social policy denies the diversity of attitudes and beliefs
strongly held by voters in different areas of the country. States should

be permitted to choose or reject physician-assisted suicide based on the
will of state voters, not forced to accept the dictates of a distant
Congress.
I.

THE OREGON LAW AND CONGRESS'S RESPONSE

A.

The Oregon Experiment

In November, 1994, Oregon voters approved a ballot measure to
legalize physician-assisted suicide.'
Following a failed court
challenge,32 Oregon voters once again approved physician-assisted
suicide by rejecting a proposal to repeal the Death with Dignity Act."

Finally, on October 27, 1997, the nation's first physician-assisted suicide

29. See infra Part IY.C.
30. See infra Part IV.D.
31. Oregon voters approved Ballot Measure 16, the Death with Dignity Act, by a
51% to 49% margin. H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 5 (1999).
32. On November 27, 1994, immediately following approval by voters of the
Death with Dignity Act, a lawsuit was filed challenging the Act on equal protection and
due process grounds. Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995). rer'd, Lee v.
Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997). The district court issued a preliminary
injunction preventing implementation of the Act pending resolution of the case. H.R.
REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 5 n.16. On August 3, 1995, the district court held the law to
be unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Lee, 891 F. Supp. at
1437. However, on February 27, 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
the ruling because the plaintiffs lacked standing. Lee, 107 F.3d at 1386, 1391. The case
was dismissed, and the district court was ordered to lift the injunction. Id.
33. This second affirmation of the Death with Dignity Act (i.e., the rejection of the
repeal attempt) passed by 60% to 40% on November 4, 1997. H.R. REP. No. 106-378,
pt. 1, at 5 n.18.

law, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act,' went into effect.
The Death with Dignity Act provides a terminally ill patient the
opportunity to request and receive from his or her physician a
prescription for medication that may be used, at the discretion of the
patient, for the purpose of ending the patient's life in a "humane and
dignified manner. 3 There are a number of safeguards incorporated into
the Oregon law to ensure that such medication is prescribed only to a
person who is terminally ill, competent, and informed, and who has
voluntarily requested the lethal medication. 6
B.

Results of the FirstTwo Years Underthe Death with Dignity Act

The 1998 and 1999 annual reports of the Oregon Health Division,
reported in the New England Journal of Medicine," clearly show that
during the first two years of legalized physician-assisted suicide, the
Oregon law worked extremely well. In 1998, a total of twenty-three
people received prescriptions for lethal medication under the law.38 Of
those, fifteen people chose to take the medication, six died from the

34. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.897 (Supp. 1998).
35. Id. § 127.805.
36. Patient eligibility under the Death with Dignity Act is restricted to adult,
Oregon residents who have a medically confirmed terminal illness, defined as "an
incurable and irreversible disease" that "will, within reasonable medical judgment,
produce death within six (6) months." Id. §§ 127.800, 127.805. The eligible patient
must request the medication to end her life by completing and signing a written form,
witnessed by two persons, one of whom must not be (a) related to the patient by blood,
marriage, or adoption, (b) entitled to any portion of the patient's estate, or (c) connected
with a health care facility. Id. §§ 127.805, 127.810, 127.897. The two witnesses must
attest that "the patient is capable, acting voluntarily, and is not being coerced to sign the
request." Id. § 127.810. Following submission of the written request to the patient's
attending physician, the eligible patient is referred to a consulting physician for
confirmation that the patient is terminally ill, is acting voluntarily, and is not suffering
from "a psychiatric or psychological disorder, or depression causing impaired
judgment." Id. §§ 127.815, 127.820, 127.825. Both the attending and consulting
physicians are charged with ensuring that the patient is acting voluntarily and with
informed consent. Id. The eligible patient must make three voluntary requests for the
lethal medication: an oral request, the written and witnessed request, and a final oral
request which must be made not less than fifteen days following submission of the
written request. Id. § 127.840. The attending physician must inform the patient of her
opportunity to rescind the request at any time and in any manner, and must repeat this
opportunity to rescind at the end of the fifteen-day waiting period. Id. §§ 127.815,
127.845, 127.850. The attending physician must again verify that the patient is making
an informed and voluntary decision immediately prior to writing the prescription for
medication. Id. § 127.815.
37. For the 1998 report, see Arthur E. Chin et al., Legalized Physician-Assisted
Suicide in Oregon-The First Year's Experience, 340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 577 (1999).
For the 1999 report, see Amy D. Sullivan et al.,
Legalized Physician-AssistedSuicide in
Oregon-The Second Year, 342 NEw ENG. J. MED. 598 (2000).
38. Chin et al., supra note 37, at 578.
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underlying disease, and two were still alive on January 1, 1999."

In

1999, a total of thirty-three people received prescriptions for lethal
medication: twenty-six took the medication, five died from the
underlying disease, and two were still alive on January 1, 2000. Death

from the lethal medication represented only 6 out of 10,000 deaths in
Oregon in 1998 and 9 out of 10,000 deaths in Oregon in 1999.' Patients
who chose physician assistance to die were not disproportionately poor,

less educated, or lacking in insurance or access to hospice.: Opponents'
fears that this law would be forced upon or chosen by a disproportionate

number of the poor, uneducated, and uninsured 3 proved unfounded."
Most importantly, in terms of this Comment, the controlled substances
used to induce death-the very substances Congress is attempting to
prohibit for this use-provided every one of the patients who used them
a peaceful and uncomplicated death. Each patient fell into a coma
within thirty minutes, and most patients died within one hour." Without
these medicationse to facilitate a dignified death, physician-assisted
suicide will cease to exist, or will revert to the use of covert acts by the
physician to facilitate death47 (at great personal risk to the physician and
39. ld. Of the two persons still alive on January 1, 1999, both died in 1999: one
from ingestion of the lethal medication and the other from the underlying disease.

Sullivan et al., supra note 37, at 599.
40. Sullivan et al., supranote 37, at 599.
41. Id. at 600.
42. Chin et al., supra note 37, at 582; Sullivan et al., supra note 37, at 602. In a
comparison with all Oregon residents who died of similar diseases in the same year.
patients who died by physician-assisted suicide were actually better educated than, but
"otherwise demographically similar to," the control group. Sullivan et al., supra note 37,
at 603. All but one of the patients who died by physician-assisted suicide were insured
for major medical expenses. Chin et al., supra note 37, at 581; Sullivan ct al., supra note
37, at 603. Finally, close to three-quarters of the patients who died by physician-assisted
suicide were receiving hospice care at the time of death. Chin et al., supra note 37, at
581; Sullivan et al., supra note 37, at 603.
43. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732 (1997) (discussing the "risk of
subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations" and the fear that "many
might resort to [physician-assisted suicide] to spare their families the substantial
financial burden of end-of-life health-care costs").
44. Chin et al., supra note 37, at 582; Sullivan et al., supranote 37, at 602.
supra note 37, at 578-79; Sullivan et al., supra note 37, at 599.
45. Chin et al.,
46. The medications prescribed were either secobarbital or pentobarbital. Chin et
al., supra note 37, at 578. Prescriptions were also written for nonlethal medications to be
used in conjunction with the above-mentioned drugs. Id.
47. Because directly inducing a patient's death is illegal, doctors are unwilling to
openly discuss this practice. However, the group Compassion in Dying acknowledges
that, prior to passage of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, they would refer terminally
ill patients "to doctors willing to covertly prescribe lethal doses of drugs." William

perhaps without the informed consent of the patient), or physicians and
patients will be desperate enough to attempt assisted suicide with less
effective and more dangerous drugs or other devices.48
C. The Road to Undermining Oregon's Law
On November 5, 1997, within days of Oregon's physician-assisted
suicide law going into effect, Thomas Constantine of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), in reply to an inquiry from the
House Committee on the Judiciary, took the official position that doctors
prescribing controlled substances under the Oregon Death with Dignity
Act would be violating the Controlled Substances Act, which would
result in revocation of their national prescribing licenses.49 The
importance of this sanction should not be underestimated.
The
Controlled Substances Act requires physicians who dispense any of the
specified controlled substances, from barbiturates to Tylenol with
Claiborne, In Oregon, Suicide Option Brings a Kinder Care, WASH. POST, Apr. 29,
1998, at Al.
48. Several individuals and groups have taken action in an attempt to make the
means of suicide more available to terminally ill patients. For example, Dr. Jack
Kevorkian, now serving a 10- to 25-year prison term for second-degree murder, claims
to have assisted in the deaths of over 100 seriously ill persons. Jim Irwin, Right-to-Die
Activists Continue Work with Kevorkian in Prison,GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Jan. 3, 2000, at
B3. In addition, Derek Humphry and his Euthanasia Research & Guidance Organization
sponsored a "Self-Deliverance New Technology Conference" in Seattle in late 1999 to
promote development of technology to aid in do-it-yourself suicide. Carol M. Ostrom,
New Devices Evolve in Search for a Way to Die, NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec.
19, 1999, at B2. One such device is the "debreather," which uses calcium hydroxide and
sodium hydroxide to remove carbon dioxide from air breathed through a mask, thereby
avoiding the "panic" reflex as the person peacefully dies of lack of oxygen. Id.
Humphry, a founder of the Hemlock Society, also produced a 34-minute "how-to"
program for committing suicide that was aired on cable television in Oregon in February,
2000. Kim Murphy, Graphic How-To Program on Suicide to Air on TV in Oregon,
Sparking Debate, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at A13. This program, "Final Exit," showed
how a person could use ordinary workshop hardware to construct a device to produce
death quickly and painlessly. Id. Moreover, Dr. Philip Nitschke of Australia is
attempting to develop a "suicide pill" or potion that can be assembled easily from
common ingredients that the government cannot ban. Ostrom, supra. These are extreme
measures taken by serious individuals with the goal of producing the means to commit
suicide safely and painlessly, and in a manner which the government will be unable to
control.
49. Letter from The Honorable Thomas K. Constantine, Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States, to Chairman Henry J. Hyde,
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, dated November 5, 1997
("[D]elivering, dispensing, or prescribing a controlled substance with the intent of
assisting a suicide would not be under any current definition a legitimate medical
purpose."), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 7 & nn.24-25 (1999). See also
Steve Suo et al., DEA Deems Suicide Law Illegal: Oregon Doctors Could Lose Their
Right to Prescribe Some Drugs If They Assist in a Suicide, THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 8,
1997, at Al.
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codeine, to obtain a registration (or prescribing license) from the
Attorney General."° Without this registration it is unlawful for a
physician to dispense such substances,' meaning she could easily be put
out of business. Moreover, the drugs regulated under the Controlled

Substances Act are necessarily the very drugs that make suicide in a
humane and dignified manner possible.'

Following a seven-month Justice Department investigation, events
took an abrupt turn. Attorney General Janet Reno released a ruling that

prescriptions for controlled substances for the purpose of causing death
are to be considered part of the ordinary practice of medicine in

Oregon.53 Therefore, such prescriptions do constitute a "legitimate
medical purpose,"' and the DEA lacks the authority to revoke the

prescribing license of a physician utilizing the Oregon law." This is the
current state of the law: physicians in Oregon, and only Oregon, may

dispense controlled substances to qualified patients, allowing those
patients to self-administer the substances for the purpose of hastening
50. 21 U.S.C. § 822(2) (1994).
51. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994).
52. Ingestion of the lethal dose of a short-acting barbiturate (controlled substance)
is expected to produce unconsciousness within five to fifteen minutes and death within
five hours. THE CENTER FOR ETHIcs INHEALTH CARE, supra note 13, at 33.
53. Letter from The Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States,
to Chairman Henry J. Hyde, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives,
dated June 5, 1998 ("Adverse action against a physician who has assisted in a suicide in
full compliance with the Oregon Act would not be authorized by the [Controlled
Substances Act]."), quotedin H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. I, at 7-8 & nn. 26-28.
54. The critical issue in the controversy surrounding the Pain Relief Promotion Act
is the interpretation given to the phrase "legitimate medical purpose." The underlying
principle that allows a prescription for a controlled substance to be legal and valid is the
requirement that it be "issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual
practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice." 21 C.F.R. §
1306.04(a) (2000). Attorney General Janet Reno ruled that because physician-assisted
suicide is permitted under Oregon law, it is to be considered part of the ordinary
practices of medicine in Oregon and therefore constitutes a "legitimate medical
purpose." See supra note 53. The Pain Relief Promotion Act would override this
position, requiring the Attorney General to "give no force and effect to State law
authorizing or permitting assisted suicide." H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. § 101 (1999); S.
1272, 106th Cong. § 101 (1999). If this bill is enacted, prescribing controlled substances
for the purpose of causing death would no longer be considered a "legitimate medical
purpose"; physicians who did so would be in violation of the Controlled Substances Act
and subject to its civil and criminal penalties. H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 2. at 6 (1999)
("[P]hysicians must be prepared to explain to DEA officials their use of these drugs, and
they lose their registration and even risk criminal penalties if they prescribe such drugs
for any purpose other than a 'legitimate medical purpose."').
55. H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 7 (citing letter from The Honorable Janet
Reno).

death. 6
In an attempt to override the Attorney General's ruling, Rep. Henry
Hyde (R-Ill.) and Sen. Don Nickles (R-Okla.) immediately introduced,
in their respective chambers, the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of
1998." 7 This bill would have amended the Controlled Substances Act to
effectively reinstate the DEA's original position, that is, to permit
revocation of the prescribing license of any physician dispensing or
distributing controlled substances for the purpose of assisting a patient to
die. Although its sponsors declined to bring the bill to a House or
Senate vote-the bill lacked crucial support from the American Medical
Association- 8 -the proposed Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act is
important because it was the first incarnation of the Pain Relief

Promotion Act of 1999.

In order to garner support among the medical community, 9 the bill's
name was changed to the Pain Relief Promotion Act and several
appealing provisions were added, such as protections for physicians
who, in alleviating a patient's pain, may inadvertently cause theyatient's
death,' and funding for new palliative care research programs. These
56. H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 24 ("As it currently stands, under both
Oregon and federal law, it is acceptable for doctors in Oregon to use federally controlled
substances for the purposes set forth in state law.").
57. H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 2151, 105th Cong. (1998).
58. H.R. REP. No. 105-683, pt. 1, at 24 (1998) ("[T]he American Medical
Association strongly opposes the legislation.").
59. The Pain Relief Promotion Act gained the express support of the American
Medical Association, National Hospice Organization, Hospice Association of America,
American Academy of Pain Management, American Society of Anesthesiologists,
Physicians for Compassionate Care, Christian Medical and Dental Society, Catholic
Health Association, Hope Hospice and Palliative Care (Florida), Americans for Integrity
in Palliative Care, American College of Osteopathic Family Physicians, Coalition of
Concerned Medical Professionals, and the Oklahoma State Medical Association. H.R.
REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 2 n.1.
In contrast, many other groups either formally oppose or have significant concerns
about the proposed Pain Relief Promotion Act, including the American Alliance of
Cancer Pain Initiatives, the American Pain Foundation, the American Pharmaceutical
Association, the American Society of Health-System Pharmacists, the American Society
of Pain Management Nurses, the American Academy of Family Physicians, the Oregon
Medical Association, the Oregon Hospice Association, the San Francisco Medical
Society, the Rhode Island Medical Society, and the Hospice Federation of
Massachusetts. Id. at 32. Also opposed to the proposed bill are the California Medical
Association, the American Nurses Association, the Oncology Nursing Society, and the
National Association of Orthopaedic Nurses. H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 2, at 17.
60. The Pain Relief Promotion Act states that "alleviating pain or discomfort in the
usual course of professional practice is a legitimate medical purpose for the dispensing,
distributing, or administering of a controlled substance that is consistent with public
health and safety, even if the use of such a substance may increase the risk of death."
H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. § 101 (1999); S. 1272, 106th Cong. § 101 (1999).
61. The proposed bill allocates five million dollars to palliative care research and
training. H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. § 202(b)(2) (1999); S. 1272, 106th Cong. § 202(b)(2)
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enticing provisions were sufficient to sway the American Medical
Association

and others despite the fact that the bill's sights remain

trained on Oregon's physician-assisted suicide law. The Pain Relief
Promotion Act states, "Nothing in this section authorizes intentionally

dispensing, distributing, or administering a controlled substance for the
purpose of causing death or assisting another person in causing death."'

A significant difference between this version of the bill and the proposed
Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act is that now the penalty for violation

is not simply revocation of the physician's prescribing license but could
also include life imprisonment for the physician.'
Given the controversial nature of physician-assisted

suicide,

consideration must be given to the legal arguments surrounding this
(1999).
62. The American Medical Association (AMA) adamantly opposes physicianassisted suicide. Susan Duerksen, AMA Backs Regulation of Pain Relievers: Divisive
Vote Supports U.S. Bill Aimed at Doctor-Assisted Suicide, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec.
9, 1999, at B3. AMA delegates met in San Diego, California, in December, 1999, where
they voted to support the Pain Relief Promotion Act. Id. Concern over the possible
"chilling effect" the legislation may have on physicians (that is, causing hesitation in
prescribing adequate pain medication because of possible criminal penalties involved if
the patient dies) prompted the AMA to seek changes in the legislation; however, the
delegates also voted to support the bill even if changes were not made. Id. Of particular
interest to the AMA is the bill's explicit acknowledgment that drugs can be appropriately
used and still hasten death. Id.Interestingly, the AMA delegates also issued a statement
that "henceforth our AMA will oppose any future legislation which gives the federal
government the responsibility to define appropriate medical practice and regulate such
practice through the use of criminal penalties." Id.
63. H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. § 101 (1999); S.1272, 106th Cong. § 101 (1999).
64. Depending on the particular controlled substance dispensed, the penalties
under § 841(b) of the Controlled Substances Act can range up to "a term of
imprisonment of not more than 20 years and if death or serious bodily injury results from
the use of such substance shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than
twenty years or more than life," and a fine of up to one million dollars. 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(C) (1994).
The House Committee on the Judiciary reports, under Dissenting Views: "Because no
provision in H.R. 2260 provides any authority negating the criminal law provisions
provided in current law under § 841 of the [Controlled Substances Act], it is clear that
the same criminal law penalties will apply to persons who dispense drugs which result in
death." H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 34. Furthermore, the "Supreme Court has held
affirmatively that the Government can use § 841 to criminally prosecute physicians
registered under the [Controlled Substances Act] for misuse of controlled substances."
Id. at 34 n.27 (citing United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124 (1975)). Interestingly,
the House Judiciary Committee voted down an amendment proposed by Rep. Howard L.
Berman (D-Cal.) to insert the following provision: "Nothing in this section shall
constitute any criminal liability other than that already existing." Id. at 19. This would
seem to suggest a potential for increasing the criminal liability of physicians deemed to
have dispensed controlled substances for the purpose of assisting suicide.

debate. Part III addresses the constitutional issue of whether Congress
has the authority to regulate the prescription of medications and medical

practices, the latter being an area traditionally regulated by the states. A
related issue is whether congressional authority extends to moral and

social causes or is confined to strictly economic regulation. Finally,
constitutionally protected individual rights are explored as a potential

limit on Congress's authority to regulate the prescription of medication.
Following this discussion, Part IV examines federalist arguments

advocating state determination, rather than congressional fiat, of the
physician-assisted suicide issue.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS

Our system of federalism requires that Congress act only in
accordance with the specific enumerated powers granted to it by the
Constitution.6 Those legitimate governmental powers not granted to the
federal government are expressly reserved to the States.' The question
here is whether regulation of physicians' prescribing practices lies
within the federal grant of power or is a power reserved to the States.
The main thrust of the Pain Relief Promotion Act is to amend 21
U.S.C. § 823 of the Controlled Substances Act by adding:
(i)(1) For purposes of this Act and any regulations to implement this Act,
alleviating pain or discomfort in the usual course of professional practice is a
legitimate medical purpose for the dispensing, distributing, or administering of a
controlled substance that is consistent with public health and safety, even if the
use of such a substance may increase the risk of death. Nothing in this section
authorizes intentionally dispensing, distributing, or administering a controlled
substance for the purpose of causing death or assisting another person in
causing death.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, in determining
whether a registration is consistent with the public interest under this Act, the
Attorney General shall give no force and
67 effect to State law authorizing or
permitting assisted suicide or euthanasia.

Does the Constitution provide Congress with sufficient authority to do
so? To begin this discussion, we look to the constitutional authority
invoked by Congress to regulate controlled substances under the Pain
Relief Promotion Act and the Controlled Substances Act.
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (explicitly listing the powers of Congress). James
Madison wrote: "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal
Government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments
are numerous and indefinite." THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.").
67. H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. § 101 (1999); S. 1272, 106th Cong. § 101 (1999).
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A.

The ConunercePower

The main source of Congress's claimed authority to regulate local
physicians' prescription of controlled substances is the Commerce

Clause, which states: "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate
Commerce... among the several States .... 5' Congress invokes this
power in its findings and declarations section of the Controlled
Substances Act, which states: "A major portion of the traffic in
controlled substances flows through interstate and foreign commerce." '
As to those purely local or intrastate incidents of traffic in controlled
substances, the congressional findings state that such activities
"nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate
commerce" because many controlled substances are "transported in
interstate commerce., 7 ' Are these claims sufficient to bring regulation of
prescription of particular substances within the power of Congress?
1.

Categoriesof Activities That May Be Regulated

According to the Supreme Court's recent clarification of Commerce
Clause doctrine in United States v. Lopez n' Congress may regulate three

68. The House Committee on Commerce finds constitutional authority for the Pain
Relief Promotion Act in Article , Section 8, Clause 3 ("The Congress shall have
Power... tlo regulate Commerce... among the several States ..."). H.R. REP. No.
106-378, pt. 2, at 10 (1999). In addition to this clause, the House Committee on the
Judiciary also finds constitutional authority for this bill in Article I, Section 8, Clause I

('The Congress shall have Power [t]o ...provide for the... general Welfare of the
United States. . . ."), and Clause 18 ('The Congress shall have Power... [t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."). H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1,
at 25 (1999).
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
70. 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (1994).
71. Id.
72. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Lopez marks the first time in sixty years that the
Supreme Court has held a federal statute invalid as beyond Congress's commerce power.
The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 made it a federal offense "for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone." Id. at 551 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(l)(A) (Supp.
V 1988)). The defendant was a 12th-grade student who carried a .38-caliber handgun

and ammunition onto high school grounds in San Antonio, Texas. Id. In striking down
the statute, the Court emphasized that the statute "by its terms has nothing to do with
'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms" Id. at 561. See also discussion infra notes 84-85, 99, and accompanying text.

broad categories of activities under its commerce power." These
categories are: (a) the use of the "channels" of interstate commerce, such
as highways, waterways, and air traffic; (b) the "instrumentalities" of
interstate commerce, such as people, machines, and "things" used in
effecting interstate commerce; and (c) activities which have a
"substantial relation" to interstate commerce, meaning "those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce."7'
The congressional
findings section of the Controlled Substances Act, therefore, claims that
Congress is empowered to act under the Commerce Clause because
controlled substances flow through, or are transported in, interstate
commerce, thus substantially affecting interstate commerce. Once an
activity is found to be within the sphere of Congress's commerce power,
Congress has great latitude in its ability to regulate the activity. The
main question, then, is whether prescribing medication is an activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce.
2.

Commercial Versus NoncommercialActivity

The Controlled Substances Act regulates the supply of designated
substances in the marketplace.76 Prescribing or dispensing ' these
substances directly affects their demand in the marketplace.
Furthermore, the act of prescribing medication is a commercial act in
that the physician performs this service in return for compensation.78
Therefore, the act of prescribing medication is a commercial activity.
Before moving to the second question-whether this commercial
activity substantially affects interstate commerce-we must examine the
significance of finding that prescribing medication is a commercial,

73.

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.

74. Id.
75. The Supreme Court held that the commerce power "is the power to regulate;
that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all
others vested in congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
76. 21 U.S.C. §§ 822-830 (1994).
77. 21 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1994) ("The term 'dispense' means to deliver a
controlled substance to an ultimate user.., by, or pursuant to the lawful order of, a
practitioner, including the prescribing and administering of a controlled substance ....
The term 'dispenser' means a practitioner who so delivers a controlled substance to an
ultimate user ....).
78. Prescribing medication is one of the many services performed by a physician,
for which she is paid by the patient, by an insurer, or through a government program.
The rare circumstance in which a physician prescribes medicine on a completely
voluntary and uncompensated basis is not considered here. Furthermore, it is unrealistic
to think that physicians could circumvent the Controlled Substances Act by merely
giving away such controlled substances.
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rather than noncommercial, activity.
The narrow majority in Lopez,"" in invalidating a federal statute,

emphasized that the statute at issue was regulating a noncommercial
activity, possession of a gun within a school zone.!

Writing for the

Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked: "The [Gun-Free School
Zones] Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a

requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate
commerce."' Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, wrote: "[U]nlike the

earlier cases to come before the Court here neither the actors nor their
conduct has a commercial character, and neither the purposes nor the
Justice
design of the statute has an evident commercial nexus."'
Thomas, concurring, wrote: "Where was no question that activities
wholly separated from business, such as gun possession, were beyond
the reach of the commerce power."8'
The recent decision in United States v. Morrison" affirmed the Lopez
framework in holding that the commerce power does not extend to

providing civil remedies to victims of crimes of violence motivated by
gender because such crimes "are not, in any sense of the phrase,

economic activity."8' Whether the activity being regulated is commercial

79. Lopez was decided with a five-member majority; the opinion was written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices Kennedy (with whom Justice O'Connor joined) and
Thomas filed separate concurring opinions, while Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer
(with whom Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined) filed dissenting opinions.
Obviously, any change in the Court's membership could represent a substantial departure
on the Lopez reasoning and outcome.
80. See supra note 72 (discussing background of Lopez). It is noteworthy that
Justice Breyer, with whom Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined, in his dissent
and noncommercial
rejects the "critical distinction between 'commercial'
'transaction[s]."' Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting 514 U.S. at
561) (alteration in original). Such an approach "would distinguish between two local
activities, each of which has an identical effect upon interstate commerce, if one, but not
the other, is 'commercial' in nature." Id. This, Justice Breyer warns, is to return to the
disreputable approach of determining Congress's commerce power based on formulas
such as "production" or "indirect" effects. Id. at 627-28 (quoting Wickard v. Filbum,
317 U.S. 111, 120 (1842)). However, Justice Breyer goes on to add that "if a distinction
between commercial and noncommercial activities is to be made, this is not the case in
which to make it," because of the close link he finds between gun possession in school
zones and education, itself a commercial activity. Id. at 628.
81. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
82. Md. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
83. ME at 599 (Thomas, J., concurring).
84. 120 S. CL 1740 (2000).
85. Id. at 1751. The Court declared: "[T]hus far in our Nation's history our cases
have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is
economic in nature." Id.

or noncommercial86 turns out to play an important role in satisfying the
second question: whether the activity regulated substantially affects
interstate commerce so that it may be regulated by Congress rather than
by the states.
3.

Aggregation of IntrastateCommercialActivity

Turning to this second question, we ask: Does the prescription of
medication substantially affect interstate commerce? Looking at the
situation most favorable to states' rights, how is interstate commerce
substantially affected when a patient visits her local physician to request
a prescription for medication that is locally manufactured and
distributed? After all, the Supreme Court has declared that "commerce,
which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man
in a state, or between different parts of the same state, and which does
not extend to or affect other states" is not within Congress's commerce
power. 7 Congress, in its findings and declarations section of the
Controlled Substances Act, states that strictly local dispensing of
controlled substances has a substantial and direct effect upon interstate
commerce because (a) the substances dispensed usually have been
transported in interstate commerce;" (b) "[1]ocal distribution... 9
contribute[s] to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances";
(c) since there is no differentiation between substances locally
manufactured and distributed and interstate substances, it is not feasible
to control the substances differently;' and (d) federal control of local
dispensing of controlled substances is essential to controlling interstate
dispensing. 9' These claims appeal to the Supreme Court's 1942 decision
in Wickard v. Filburn,2 permitting Congress to regulate purely intrastate
activities that, when aggregated with like activities, substantially affect
interstate commerce.
In Wickard, regarding a single wheat farmer's production of wheat for
86. For an interesting perspective on Commerce Clause analysis, see Grant S.
Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First
Principlesto Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but PreserveState Control Over
Social Issues, 85 IowA L. Rnv. 1, 11-12 (1999) (advocating a decisive distinction
between commercial and noncommercial activities and proposing the existence of
congressional authority to regulate all commercial activities that affect more than one
state but no congressional authority, through the Commerce Clause, to regulate
noncommercial activities).
87. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824).
88. 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (1994).
89. Id. § 801(4).
90. Id. § 801(5).

91. Id. § 801(6).
92. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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his own home consumption, the Court held: "That [the farmer's] own
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not
enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as
here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly
situated, is far from trivial." Although the Court in Lopez referred to
the Wickard holding as "perhaps the most far reaching example of
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity,"" the Court did not
cut back on the holding. Instead the Court distinguished Lopez from
Wickard on the basis of commercial versus noncommercial activity,
noting that Wickard "involved economic activity in a way that the
possession of a gun in a school zone does not."" This distinction proved
critical to the decision in Lopez. Because possessing a gun in a
particular place is not itself a commercial activity, the Court held that:
[The Gun-Free School Zones Act] is not an essential part of a larger regulation
of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless

the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under
our eases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected
ith a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially
affects interstate commerce.9

The Lopez Court also hinted that perhaps its decision might have gone
the other way if Congress had included an interstate commerce

component to the gun possession, such as requiring that the gun in issue

had been transported in interstate commerce. 97 However, absent this

"express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete
set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection
with or effect on interstate commerce,"" the regulation of this
noncommercial activity failed to satisfy the substantial effects test and
93. Id. at 127-28 (emphasis added).
94. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 561 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 561-62. Specifically, the Court stated:
[The Gun-Free School Zones Act] contains no jurisdictional element which
would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in
question affects interstate commerce. For example, in United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336 (1971), the Court interpreted former 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), which
made it a crime for a felon to 'receive[e], posses[s], or transporit] in commerce
or affecting commerce... any firearm.' The Court interpreted the possession
component of § 1202(a) to require an additional nexus to interstate
commerce ....
Id. (citation omitted) (alterations in original).
98. Id. at 562.

was therefore beyond Congress's commerce power.
In summary, where the activity regulated is a commercial activity,
Congress may aggregate purely local acts in determining whether the
sum of such acts substantially affects interstate commerce. However,
where the activity is noncommercial, this aggregation may not be
permitted. 99 For the purposes of this Comment, because the act of
prescribing and dispensing medication is generally a commercial
activity,' ° the aggregation of even purely intrastate incidents of
dispensing locally manufactured and distributed drugs can be found to
have a "substantial affect" on the interstate commerce of the substances
Congress intends to control.
In meeting the substantial effect
requirement, the Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause
provides Congress with great latitude in regulating that commercial
activity. Therefore, Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate
the prescription and dispensing of controlled substances. In reality,
Congress should have the authority to regulate such substances; if not,
the bulk of our federal drug laws would be nullified. The real issue
involves how Congress uses this constitutional authority. It is better that
Congress has the power to regulate controlled substances, but that it do
so with due respect for the demonstrated will of state voters.
B.

TraditionalState Dominance in Medical Regulation

A second possible constitutional argument against the Pain Relief
Promotion Act concerns implied limits on congressional authority due to
traditional state dominance in regulating medical practices. In United
States v. Lopez,'° ' the Supreme Court defended state sovereignty by
rejecting the Government's argument that Congress could regulate gun
possession in a school zone."° The Court stated that if Congress were
permitted to so regulate, "it is difficult to perceive any limitation on
federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or
education where States historically have been sovereign. '' This
statement seems to indicate that federalism will protect state sovereignty
in certain historically state-dominated areas. In addition to criminal law
enforcement and education, regulation of state medical practices is such
an area where states historically have been sovereign.

99. United States v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 1754 (2000) ("We accordingly
reject the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct
based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce.").
100. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
101. 514U.S. 549 (1995).
102. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
103. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
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In Linder v. United States,"° the Court explicitly stated: "Obviously,
direct control of medical practice in the States is beyond the power of
the Federal Government.""' Linder concerned the Harrison Narcotic
Law 06 through which Congress used its taxing authority""0 to regulate,

among other things, the dispensing of controlled substances. The Court
went on to confine Congress's power to interfere in state medical

practices, declaring: "Incidental regulation of such [medical] practice by
Congress through a taxing act cannot extend to matters plainly
inappropriate and unnecessary to reasonable enforcement of a revenue
measure."1 0 In other words, Congress may not use its authority, here
through its power to tax, to unnecessarily interfere with state-sanctioned

medical practices.
Second, Congress itself has declared its intention to proscribe federal
interference with state medical practices. The preamble to the Health
Insurance for the Aged Act, better known as Medicare, states:
Prohibitionagainst any Federal interference. Nothing in this subchapter shall
be construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any
supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which
medical services are provided... or to exercise any supervision or control over
the administration or operation of any such institution, agency, or person.," '

Why, then, is Congress, through the Pain Relief Promotion Act,

preempting Oregon law with respect to its medical practices, that is,
legitimate prescription of medications to patients? The answer again
turns on the fact that prescribing medication is not exclusively a matter
of medical practice but is also a commercial act."' In the line of cases
recently recognizing areas of state sovereignty based on traditional state

104.

268 U.S. 5 (1925).

105. Id.at 18.
106. The Harrison Narcotic Law, approved in 1914, required persons who
"produce, import, manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute, or give
away opium or coca leaves," or their derivatives to register with the "Collector of
Internal Revenue" and pay a special tax. Id. at 12. The law prohibited the use or
possession of these drugs, with one relevant exception: "the dispensing or distribution of
any of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by a physician ...registered under this Act in the
course of his professional practice." Idat 13.
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes ....
").
108. Linder,268 U.S. at 18.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1994) (emphasis added).
110. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing the commercial
aspect of prescribing medication).

dominance, none involved regulation of a commercial act."'
As
discussed earlier,"' 2 once an activity is found to be within the commerce
power, Congress's authority to regulate it is plenary. This power "is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations [other] than are prescribed in the
constitution." '" 3 Therefore, traditional state dominance would seem to
protect the noncommercial aspects of regulating medical practices, such
as licensing physicians. However, when a commercial aspect of medical
practice, such as prescribing medication, is found to substantially affect
interstate commerce, then Congress has the constitutional authority to
regulate it, regardless of traditional state dominance in regulating that

activity.
C. Congress'sMotive Is Moral and Social, Not Purely Economic
A third argument that Congress's Commerce Clause power should be
limited in the case of physician-assisted suicide concerns the moral and
social motive behind Congress's proposed regulation. The Commerce
Clause authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce, '4 but
overriding Oregon's physician-assisted suicide law is a moral and social
policy decision, not an economic decision."'
Should Congress be
permitted to extend its Commerce Clause authority to preempt state laws
for moral and social preferences? The answer is a bittersweet "Yes."
On the one hand, history has shown several instances in which federal
intervention was necessary to protect the civil rights of individuals from
the parochial interests of the states."' Without such authority much of
111. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress lacks
the power to require state law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on
prospective gun purchasers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding
that Congress lacks the power to force a state to enact particular legislation of Congress's
choosing regarding "tak[ing] title" to low-level radioactive waste generated in a state);
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding that Congress lacks the power to
interfere with a state's mandatory retirement provisions for state judges through its Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
112. See supra Part III.A.
113. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ...[t]o regulate
Commerce... among the several states ....).
115. Tom Stacy, Whose Interests Does Federalism Protect?, 45 U. KAN. L. REV.
1185, 1185 n.5 (1997) ("The overriding aim of the Commerce Clause is to give Congress
authority to foster an effective interstate economy. This aim is apparent in the text and
overall structure of Article I." (citation omitted)).
116. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 367 (1997)
("Calhoun's nullification movement in response to the tariff, slavery, the Civil War
followed by Reconstruction, Jim Crow, and the struggle over civil rights are all events in
which southern states made choices that ultimately led the national government to take
power from the states.").
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our federal civil rights legislation would be unconstitutional." 7 In Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,"' the Supreme Court upheld Title
II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act"9 as it applied to the racially
discriminatory practices of a modest downtown Atlanta motel. The
Court stated:
In framing Title 11 of this Act Congress was also dealing with what it considered
a moral problem. But that fact does not detract from the overwhelming
evidence of the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on
commercial intercourse.... Congress was not restricted by the fact that the
particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing was also
deemed a moral and social wrong.'20

This reasoning was also applied in Katzenbach v.McClung, 2 ' the

companion case to Heart of Atlanta Motel, in which a small familyowned restaurant refused to seat African-Americans inside the
restaurant; that is, African-Americans could only purchase take-out

food."

Despite the fact that there was not even a claim that interstate

travelers ate at the restaurant,2' Congress was permitted to apply Title H

of the Civil Rights Act'2 4 to end this racially discriminatory practice.

The Court ultimately resorted to a finding that, since forty-six percent of
the meat served in the restaurant was procured from out-of-state
sources
-'
a commercial activity that can be aggregated-Congress was

empowered to make a moral and social policy determination regarding
where African-Americans were permitted to sit in a restaurant.
The scope of the Commerce Clause is indeed broad. This point was
summarized in United States v. Darby:"z "The motive and purpose of a
117. Joseph D. Grano, Teaching the Conmmerce Clause,78 B.U. L. REv. 1163, 1174
(1998) ("In basing the 1964 Civil Rights Act on the Commerce Clause, for example
Congress may have been concerned more with morality and human dignity than with the
disruptive effects of discrimination on the economy.").
118. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
119. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat. 243 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a (1994)). Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides that "lalll persons shall
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services ...and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation ... without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a(a) (1994).
120.

HeartofAtlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 257.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

379 U.S. 294 (1964).
Id. at 296.
Idat 298.
See supra note 119 (discussing Title 11 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
McClung, 379 U.S. at 296.
312 U.S. 100 (1941).

regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative
judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no
restriction and over which the courts are given no control.' ' 7 This
clearly illustrates that Congress can exercise its immense commerce
power to restrict the use of controlled substances for the explicit purpose
of nullifying the legitimate practice of physician-assisted suicide in
Oregon.

In sum, where the activity being regulated falls within Congress's
commerce power, the moral and social motives spurring the regulation
are immaterial, and Congress has the power to so regulate. Such
motives become truly influential during the process of deciding whether
Congress should so regulate. With respect to the Pain Relief Promotion
Act, the Dissenting Views section of the House Committee on the
Judiciary reports:
While there have been instances in our Nation's history where it was
appropriate for Federal law to supercede State law in order to fulfill
constitutional imperatives, such as the realm of civil rights, this is not one of
those occasions. States historically have regulated the medical profession, and
the Federal Government has no constitutional authority or imperative to do so
now.'2

Should this argument fall on deaf ears in Congress, a constitutional
argument based on motive will not limit Congress's power to enact the
Pain Relief Promotion Act.
D. IndividualRights Arguments
Two additional arguments have been asserted in defense of patients'
rights, and may be used to argue in favor of limiting Congress's power
to interfere with physician-assisted suicide. First, an argument could be
made that the First Amendment protects the physician-patient
relationship such that Congress may not interfere with a doctor's advice
to the patient.'29 A second argument is that an individual right or liberty
127. Id. at 115.
128. H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 38 (1999).
129. A related argument is that the Pain Relief Promotion Act is unconstitutionally
vague because of the difficulty in determining a physician's intent in prescribing large
doses of pain relieving medication. A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to give "the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
Under the Pain Relief Promotion Act, a physician may legitimately prescribe controlled
substances with the intent to alleviate pain, "even if the use of [such a substance] may
increase the risk of death." H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. § 101 (1999). However, the same
physician prescribing the same medication to the same patient but with the intent to
hasten death is subject to severe penalties. See supra note 64. The chilling effect this
ambiguity creates for physicians is described in the House Committee on Commerce
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interest exists under the Due Process Clause that allows a patient to
hasten his or her own death. However, both of these arguments to date
have been unsuccessful in curbing Congress's power.
1.

FirstAmendment Protectionof Physician-PatientRelationship

How much protection does the First Amendment afford to the
physician-patient relationship?
In an area closely analogous to

Congress's attempt to nullify Oregon's physician-assisted suicide law,
the DEA and Congress took action to prohibit physicians from

prescribing marijuana for medical use"" after voters in California and
Arizona overwhelmingly passed initiatives authorizing such use.'" In
Conant v. McCaffrey,'

plaintiffs (physicians, patients, and nonprofit

organizations) brought action against the United States government,
seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the DEA from revoking the
national prescribing registration of, and instituting criminal actions
against, physicians who advise their patients regarding the medical use

report:
[This bill raises the prospect of the Drug Enforcement [Administration]

(DEA) "second guessing" a physician or a health care professional's intent in
prescribing and using large doses of opiates for patients who are in severe pain.

Title I of the bill could turn the DEA into a medical oversight body charged
with investigating the "intent" and "purpose" of a physician's care for a
patient. The threat of investigation alone could scare health care professionals
away from providing quality care to the neediest patients.
H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 2, at 17 (1999).
130. The Drug Enforcement Administration, in conjunction with the Clinton
Administration, issued "Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and
California Proposition 215," describing specific sanctions it intended to impose on
physicians who recommend marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance, to patients.
Notice, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997). For its part, Congress proposed, and
ultimately failed to pass, the Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1997, S. 40, 105th Cong.
(1997), which would have subjected a physician who advised a patient regarding the
medical use of marijuana to revocation of her national prescribing license, criminal
penalties, and fines.
131. Eric E. Sterling, Drug Policy: A Smorgasbord of Conundruns Spiced by
Emotions Around Children and Violence, 31 VAL U. L. REv. 597, 643 (1997). In

November, 1996, California voters approved, by a 55% margin, Proposition 215, which
provides "for a medical use defense to a prosecution of marijuana possession.
distribution, or cultivation." Id. at 628. Arizona voters passed, by more than 65%,
Proposition 200, which authorizes physicians to prescribe marijuana, as well as other
Schedule I controlled substances under the Arizona Controlled Substances Act, to
seriously ill or terminally ill patients. Id. at 629.
132. 172 F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1997).

of marijuana,'33 as permitted by the California Compassionate Use Act.'
The district court observed that the physician-patient relationship is a
protected relationship for First Amendment purposes: "Although the
Supreme Court has never held that the physician-patient relationship, as
such, receives special First Amendment protection, its case law assumes,
without so deciding, that the relationship is a protected one.""' As such,
the District Court held that the First Amendment protects physicianpatient communication regarding the medical use of marijuana, but only
up to the point at which the physician's recommendation makes her
liable for aiding and abetting or conspiracy to violate federal or state
drug laws.'36 The crucial difference between physicians advising

patients on the medical use of marijuana (a controlled substance) and
physicians' conduct under the Oregon physician-assisted suicide law is

that in Oregon physicians step beyond merely advising patients to
actually prescribing barbiturates (controlled substances).
Amendment protected speech'3 7 argument is insufficient here.'

A First

133. Id. at 685-87. The court also granted plaintiffs class certification, defined as
follows:
(1) All licensed physicians practicing in the State of California who treat
patients diagnosed with HIV/AIDS, cancer, glaucoma, and/or seizures or
muscle spasms associated with a chronic, debilitating condition, and who, in
the context of a bona fide physician-patient relationship, discuss, approve, or
recommend the medical use of marijuana for these patients based on the
physician's best medical judgment; and
(2) All patients in the State of California diagnosed with HIV/AIDS,
cancer, glaucoma, and/or seizures or muscle spasms associated with a chronic,
debilitating condition, who, in the context of a bona fide physician-patient
relationship, communicate with their physicians about the medical use of
marijuana.
Id. at 693.
134. California voters passed the initiative known as Proposition 215 or the
Compassionate Use Act of 1996 in November, 1996. The Act provides, in pertinent part,
that:
seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical
purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has been
recommended by a physician who has determined that the person's health
would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia,
AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other
illness for which marijuana provides relief.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2000).
135. Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 694. See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 884 (1992) (finding that the "doctor-patient relation does not underlie or
override... the right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy");
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 445 (1983)
(discussing relationship of trust between patient and doctor).
136. Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 700.
137. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech ....
").
138. However, the Conant decision is instructive in its interpretation of the DEA's
authority to revoke a physician's prescribing license under the Controlled Substances
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2.

Liberty Interest Under the Due ProcessClause

In Washington v. Glucksberg,"' plaintiffs (physicians, terminally ill
patients, and a nonprofit organization) challenged a Washington statute
banning physician-assisted suicide on the grounds that such a ban
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."* The
Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, has held that "liberty" in the Due
Process Clause protects such personal and intimate matters as the rights
to marry,4 to have children,"' to direct the education and upbringing of
one's children, "3 to marital privacy,'" to use contraception,'" to bodily
integrity,' 6 and to abortion. 4 In a closely analogous case, Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health,'' the Court held that the

Constitution granted competent persons a "constitutionally protected

right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition. ' " " From this, the
plaintiffs in Glucksberg asserted the argument that the broad,
individualistic principles reflected in these cases protect the "liberty of
competent, terminally ill adults to make end-of-life decisions free of
undue government interference."'" The Court in Glucksberg, however,
Act.

In particular, the Controlled Substances Act provides for revocation of the

prescribing license in the event the physician's conduct is "inconsistent with the public
interest." 21 U.S.C. § 823(0 (1994). The district court in Conant held that the term
"public interest," as used in 21 U.S.C. § 823, encompasses "only actual violations of
state and federal drug law." Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 699. On the one hand, this
interpretation limits the potentially broad application of "[s]uch other conduct which
may threaten the public health and safety:' 21 U.S.C. § 823(0(5). On the other hand, if
the Pain Relief Promotion Act succeeds in making the prescription of controlled
substances for the purpose of assisting suicide a violation of federal law, physicians will
be subject to the penalties of the Controlled Substances Act.
139. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
140. ld.
at 705-06. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... .
141. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
142. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
143. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925).
144. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
145. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
146. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
147. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
148. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
149. IL at 279.
150. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724 (1997) (quoting Brief for
Respondents 10). In addition, plaintiffs emphasized the statement in Case. "At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define

disagreed. In distinguishing Glucksberg from Cruzan, the Court stated:
The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another may be just as
personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment,
but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection. Indeed, the two acts are
widely and reasonably regarded as quite distinct. In Cruzan... we certainly
gave no intimation that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment could
be somehow transmuted into a right to assistance in committing suicide. "5

The decision in Glucksberg is notable in two respects. First, its
holding clearly denies constitutional protection for any "right" to
assistance in committing suicide.152 Second, the same decision also
provides the encouragement to allow the physician-assisted suicide
debate to continue "as it should in a democratic society."" 3
In summary, the act of prescribing medication is a commercial activity
that, when viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects the interstate
commerce of controlled substances. As such, this activity falls within
Congress's Commerce Clause power, which is plenary. This commerce
power cannot be limited by either state sovereignty based on traditional
regulation of medical practices or the argument that Congress's motive
is moral rather than economic. Constitutionally protected individual
rights-privacy and freedom of speech and association-are also
insufficient to limit Congress here. Therefore, Congress possesses the
power, through the Commerce Clause, to regulate the prescription of
controlled substances and thereby enact the Pain Relief Promotion Act
which will preempt Oregon's physician-assisted suicide law. If there is
to be any protection for Oregon's law-that Congress should not
exercise its commerce power-that protection must come from a
structural argument that federalism demands congressional restraint
here. Part IV examines the federalism arguments favoring state
determination of the physician-assisted suicide issue.
IV. FEDERALISM ARGUMENTS
A.

Why FederalismMatters

In designing the Constitution, the Framers sought to ensure protection
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State." Id. at
726-27 (citing Brief for Respondents 12, quoting Casey,505 U.S. at 851).
151. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725-26 (citation omitted).
152. Id. at 728 ("[T]he asserted 'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.").
153. Id. at 735 ("Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and
profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted
suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic
society.").
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of the fights of the people by creating two governments rather than one.
As James Madison explained:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people, is
first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to
each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will
[control] each other, at the same time that each will be [controlled] by itself.' -

Thus, the power to govern was divided between the national
government and the states. Powers of the national government are
limited and enumerated; the remaining powers are reserved to the

states. 5 However, many factors have served over the years to expand

the scope of national power at the expense of state sovereignty. 6 Yet
there are important benefits of federalism that are lost when power is
centralized in the national government.
In particular, retaining

government authority at the subnational level fosters greater political
participation, and increased accountability, and state governments can be
more innovative as they experiment with solutions.' Part IV looks at

each of these benefits of federalism in arguing that the issue of
physician-assisted suicide is better decided at the state level rather than

by Congress and, therefore, that the Pain Relief Promotion Act should
not become law.'
B.

GreaterPoliticalParticipationin Democracy

State government is closer to the people and provides a greater

opportunity for voters to influence and participate in the decisions that

affect their everyday lives.'5 9 As Justice Powell noted in Garcia v.San
154. THEFEDERALST NO. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
155. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8; id amend. X ('The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.").
156. Friedman, supra note 116, at 367-78 (arguing that greater centralization of
government at the national level is the result of several factors: historical discontent with
state positions on civil rights, the expansion of technology, the breakdown in judicial
formalistic barriers, judicial deference to political actors, the political economy benefits
of central decision-making, and the importance of trade).
157. Id at 389-400.
158. If the Pain Relief Promotion Act is enacted, the Supremacy Clause requires
that state laws to the contrary are void. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2 ("This Constitution.
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be
the supreme Law of the Land ....
").
159. Friedman, supra note 116, at 390 ("[S]tate and local government does provide

Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,'60 "The Framers recognized that
the most effective democracy occurs at local levels of government,

where people with firsthand knowledge of local problems have more
ready access to public officials responsible for dealing with them. This
is as true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted."' 161 Even
more democratic is the initiative and referendum process ,162 through
which the citizens of Oregon asked their fellow voters to decide the issue
of physician-assisted suicide for their state. Oregon voters approvednot once, but twice-the Death with Dignity Act, 63 which allows
physicians to prescribe lethal medication to qualified terminally ill
patients. ' 64 This is direct democracy in action. The voters of Oregon
have themselves made physician-assisted suicide the law in their state.

This is by no means an argument that all states should approve
physician-assisted suicide. Rather, states should be free to decide for

themselves whether physician-assisted suicide is an appropriate social
policy for its citizens. Indeed many states have chosen to ban physicianassisted suicide.'6
The point is that physician aid in dying is a
controversial issue upon which intelligent, well-meaning people have
differing views, and these views are better represented by state-level
policy choices than by a single federal law. To illustrate this concept,
Michael McConnell offers this example:
[A]ssume that there are only two states, with equal populations of 100 each.
Assume further that 70 percent of State A, and only 40 percent of State B, wish
many more avenues for citizen participation than does the national government."). See
also DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGuE 93-94 (1995) ("[T]o the extent that
the democratic ideal is more fully realized on a municipal or town level, the states are in
a far better position to respond to local pressures for home rule than is a more remote and
centralized government." (citation omitted)).
160. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
161. Id. at 575 n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
162. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Turning Federalism Inside Out: IntrastateAspects of
Interstate Regulatory Competition, 149 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 149, 168 (1996) ("[T]he
initiative system allows issues to be considered by the populace and not by elected
officials with their own, particular self-interests.... [I]nitiative lawmaking empowers a
type of constituency that is represented very differently in a more republican form of
government.").
163. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing election results).
164. See supra note 36 (discussing safeguards of the Death with Dignity Act).
165. Currently, assisted suicide is prohibited in forty-five states, either through
statutes or common law. Thirty-nine states prohibit assisted suicide through statutes:
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin. H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 4 n. 11(1999). Six states
criminalize assisted suicide through common law: Alabama, Idaho, Massachusetts,
Nevada, Vermont, and West Virginia. Id.
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to outlaw smoking in public buildings. The others are opposed. If the decision
is made on a national basis by a majority rule, 110 people will be pleased. and
90 displeased. If a separate decision is made by majorities in each state, 130
will be pleased, and only 70 displeased."

This concept recognizes the diversity of attitudes, experiences, and
beliefs of people in different parts of the country and endeavors to more
fully represent that diversity through state-determined social policies. 67'
The one-size-fits-all approach of federal legislation necessarily destroys
this diversity of social choice. Physician-assisted suicide is a social
policy choice that should be determined by state voters, not by distant
members of Congress."
This is not to say that there is no place for Congress to regulate
activities in a state; there are many issues, such as cross-border
pollution, that require a federal response, because states may be
incapable of fashioning a satisfactory solution. But issues that are truly
local, that do not affect the activities or environment of another state,
should be left to state control. Physician-assisted suicide, as practiced in
Oregon, is such a strictly local issue. Oregon law requires that a person
requesting lethal medication be diagnosed with a terminal disease,
meaning the patient has less than six months to live.' In addition, the
patient must satisfy the law's residence requirement. '" Thus, residents
of other states will not flock to Oregon to die; there are no externalities
166. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1484, 1494 (1987).
167. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 86, at 118. Nelson and Pushaw assert:
[I]n the noncommercial sphere, we object to federal standards because they
wipe out all differences of opinion on social, cultural, or moral issuesregional, state, and local. We believe that such diversity of views is healthy
and should be encouraged, and that the only practical means to do so is
through state and local legislation.
Id.
168. Indeed, only 7 of the 535 Members of Congress (2 Senators and 5

Representatives) represent Oregon voters.
169. Op. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800, 127.805 (Supp. 1998).
170.

The Death with Dignity Act's residency requirement states:
Only requests made by Oregon residents under ORS 127.800 to 127.897
shall be granted. Factors demonstrating Oregon residency include but are not
limited to:
(1) Possession of an Oregon driver license;
(2) Registration to vote in Oregon;
(3) Evidence that the person owns or leases property in Oregon; or
(4) Filing of an Oregon tax return for the most recent tax year.
Id. § 127.860 (1999), Oregon State Legislature, availableat http'J/www.leg.state.or.us/
ors/127.htnl.

about which other states should legitimately be concerned. Whether to
allow or prohibit physician-assisted suicide is a local issue that should be
decided by local voters.
C. Accountability
Closely related to public participation is the concept that government
officials should be held accountable to voters for their decisions.'
When decisions are made at state and local levels-and most especially
by popular referendum-the decision-makers actually live in the
localities impacted by the policies.'
When decisions concerning
Oregonians are made in Washington, D.C., at most only the

representatives from Oregon (five Congressmen and two Senators) can
be held accountable by Oregon voters.' In this case, the Oregon voters
themselves have decided to permit physician-assisted suicide. Yet
Members of Congress who are not electorally accountable to Oregonians
are trying to override their law.
Furthermore, Congress is eluding accountability on this issue in a
second respect. The Pain Relief Promotion Act is deceptive in that its
main function is to nullify physician-assisted suicide under the guise of

promoting pain relief.' 74 As Governor John Kitzhaber of Oregon, a
physician, explains, this bill will result in a reduction in the use of

controlled substances to relieve pain, not an increase.
In its zealous effort to block Oregon's law, Congress has passed a bill that
would have a chilling effect on the use of controlled substances in palliative
care for the terminally ill. It does this by making it illegal for physicians to
knowingly prescribe drugs to aid in a death.... Faced with the specter of
investigation by the Drug Enforcement Administration, prison or loss of their

171. SHAPIRO, supra note 159, at I I ("The political integrity of a republican form
of government does center on the accountability of elected representatives to their
electorate .... ).
172. Friedman, supra note 116, at 395.
173. Oregon voters may also hold the President accountable. However, with
elections four years apart, and given the diversity of issues on which voters elect a
president, there is limited presidential electoral accountability on this issue.
174. In considering action by the House Committee on the Judiciary, Rep. Melvin
L. Watt (D-N.C.) proposed two amendments which, by their defeat, illustrate the purpose
of this bill. H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 15 (1999). Rep. Watt proposed to insert
language that would "authorize the dispensing of a controlled substance for the purpose
of causing death or assisting in causing death when in compliance with applicable State,
Federal or local laws." Id. The second proposal was to strike the language requiring the
Attorney General "to give no force or effect to State law authorizing or permitting
assisted suicide or euthanasia." Icl Both proposed amendments were voted down by a
majority of members of the House Committee on the Judiciary. Id. at 15-16. Had either
of these proposals been included in the provisions of the Pain Relief Promotion Act,
there would be no doubt that Congress was concerned primarily with palliative pain
relief rather than overriding Oregon state law.
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practice, many doctors will treat pain75less aggressively than is required for full
relief, in order to defend themselves.1

If Congress wants to outlaw physician-assisted suicide, it should enact
a straight prohibition against it. Congress should not deflect its
accountability for this effect by appealing to an unrealistic and
unworkable, 76 but universally desirable, ideal of greater pain relief for
terminally ill patients.
D. States as Laboratoriesfor Social Experimentation
Federalism affords each state government the flexibility to innovate in
reaching solutions to local problems. The notion of states as laboratories
for social experimentation provides that the best innovations will be
adopted by other governing bodies facing similar problems, maximizing

successful results with a minimum of risk.'" State experimentation, or
175. John A. Kitzhaber, Congress's Medical Meddlers, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY.
EDrMON, Nov. 8, 1999, at 26. See also supra note 129 (discussing the chilling effect this
legislation may have on physicians' decisions regarding the amount of pain medication
to prescribe).
176. The Dissenting Views section of the House Committee on the Judiciary report
states:
This legislation represents an unnecessary intrusion into the sensitive
relationship between terminally-ill patients and their physicians and would
empower Federal law enforcement agents to second-guess the considered
medical judgment of physicians, pharmacists, and patients. Moreover, by
threatening medical professionals with long prison sentences and strict
liability, this bill would inhibit physicians from aggressively treating pain,
limit patient access to palliative care, and make death more painful.
H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 31 (1999). Furthermore:
Not only does the bill contort the purpose of the [Controlled Substances Act],
it also would lead to the establishment of a new and burdensome oversight
mechanism whereby the DEA would be expected to police every prescription
that every healthcare worker, distributor, and manufacturer in the country
dispenses. Moreover, the DEA could monitor such activities only by imposing
vast new paperwork requirements on all regulated parties or through a network
of healthcare workers reporting on each other, the likes of which would be
unprecedented and fundamentally destructive to the proper functioning of the
practice of medicine. All of this would occur even though the DEA has no
expertise whatsoever in medical care.
Id. at 38.
177. See SHAPIRO, supra note 159, at 85. Shapiro observes:

The notion of the states as "laboratories" has two aspects: ... after thorough
testing in a variety of contexts, a national solution will emerge that is suitable
for implementation in every state. A related form-rooted in notions of
pluralism and relativism-recognizes that given the wide variation in
conditions and preferences in a country as diverse as ours, different solutions

innovation, is an "evolutionary process.""' That is, as governments in
various states innovate to solve similar problems, the most attractive
solutions can be adopted by other states, while the less attractive or
problematic solutions can be discarded.' 9 Better solutions evolve as we
learn from our mistakes and the experiences of others. The classic
formulation of this concept is from Justice Brandeis:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
180 novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.

Indeed, it is just this sort of continued state-by-state social
experimentation the Supreme Court called for in Washington v.
Glucksberg: "Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an
earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality
of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to
continue, as it should in a democratic society.'2 Yet, Congress would
end this debate and annul Oregon's law.
In Oregon, physician-assisted suicide has been and continues to be
extensively debated, as proponents and opponents together search for a
safer and more responsive law. In June 1999, Governor John Kitzhaber
signed Oregon Senate Bill 491, which amends and clarifies specific
provisions of the Death with Dignity Act.' The most important aspect
of Senate Bill 491 is that it is the product of a collaborative effort
involving proponents of the Act as well as many groups that had fought
to repeal the physician-assisted suicide law.' Some of the compromises
worked out by these various groups include clarification of the Oregon
residency requirement, definition of providers covered by immunity,
definition of a physician's counseling requirement, clarification of a
health care provider's right to have policies prohibiting participation in
the Act and to sanction physicians who violate the provider's policies,
and limitations on those sanctions.'s
These refinements to the
may be best for different states.
Id.
178. Friedman, supra note 116, at 399.
179. Id. at 399-400.
180. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
181. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
182. Id. at 735.
183. Oregon Legislature Votes to Strengthen Death With Dignity Law, OR. REP.
(Or. Death With Dignity Legal Def. and Educ. Ctr., Portland, Or.), Spring/Summer 1999,
at 1.
184. See id.
185. Senate Bill 491: How It Clarifies the Oregon Death With Dignity Law, OR.
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physician-assisted suicide law, which strengthen the law and prevent
unwanted expansion, would not have come about had the debate
regarding physician-assisted suicide been foreclosed by Congress.
It is clear from the first two years of physician-assisted suicide in
Oregon that the fears of its opponents were unfounded.' There is no
indication that patients who chose physician-assisted suicide were
concerned about the financial burden of their illnesses or that they were
disproportionately poor, uneducated, or uninsured.'" The safeguards
embedded in Oregon's Death with Dignity Act have worked well to
permit aid in dying to a small number of competent, terminally ill
patients." With no evidence of abuse, the fears of opponents are merely
speculative. The Oregon law provides the first real opportunity to
perform a comprehensive study of physician-assisted suicide:' why
patients choose assistance to die, the effects of physician-assisted suicide
on physicians and health care providers, the efficacy of lethal
medications, and how society can better attend to the needs of the dying.
Oregonians should be permitted to utilize physician-assisted suicide, to
continue to refine its guidelines and safeguards, and to monitor its
results; this will allow the rest of the nation to better understand this
issue and its consequences from an empirical standpoint (rather than
from fearful speculation), and then to determine--on a state-by-state
basis-its appropriateness as a social policy.
V. CONCLUSION
Why do some terminally ill patients utilize physician assistance to
die? It is not fear of intractable pain or concern about the financial
impact of their illnesses."9 Those patients who chose physician
assistance to die in the first two years under Oregon's Death with
Dignity Act did so out of concern for their autonomy and personal

REP. (Or. Death With Dignity Legal Def. and Educ. Ctr., Portland, Or.), Spring/Summer

1999, at 1.
186. See supraPart II.B.
187. Chin et al., supra note 37, at 582; Sullivan et al., supra note 37, at 602.
188. See supranote 36 (discussing safeguards of the Death with Dignity Act).
189. Chin et al., supra note 37, at 577 ("Although there have been many studies of
physician-assisted suicide, there are no data on the experiences of patients and
physicians when the practice is legal.").
190. Death With Dignity Lmv Works Perfectlyfor First Year, OR. REP. (Or. Death
With Dignity Legal Def. and Educ. Ctr., Portland, Or.), Winter/Spring 1999, at 1.

control. 9' Their devastating illnesses would take their lives; they simply
wanted to control the manner in which they died." It is this very aspect
of autonomy and personal control that Congress proposes to take from
these terminally ill patients by prohibiting physicians from prescribing
the medications that will efficiently aid patients in dying without
suffering. In its attempt to pass the Pain Relief Promotion Act, Congress
also attacks the autonomy and sovereignty of states. The Act requires
the Attorney General to "give no force and effect to State law
authorizing or permitting assisted suicide."'" Physician assistance to die
is an intensely personal choice and a social policy that should be made
as close to the voter as possible-at the state rather than national level.
Most particularly, when voters have used the initiative and referendum
process to make this important social policy themselves, this decision
should not be overridden by politicians in Washington, D.C., who are
largely unaccountable and often unresponsive to these state voters.
Under the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause interpretation,
Congress has the power to annul Oregon's physician-assisted suicide
law. As Justice O'Connor succinctly stated: "[A]I1 that stands between
the remaining essentials of state sovereignty and Congress is the latter's
underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint."'" Congress should muster
the self-restraint to allow state voters to decide for themselves whether
physician-assisted suicide is an appropriate social policy in their state.
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